Conference report

of the annual Eastern Circles conference on Ukraine

“Ukraine: Attrition, Resilience, Innovation and Adaptation”

in partnership with Euro Creative and the Ukrainian Embassy in France, under the patronage of the President of the French Senate European Affairs committee Jean-Francois Rapin

16/01/2026

Paris

Keynotes:

Ambassador Vadym Omelchenko:

Attrition, Resilience, Innovation and Adaptation is not theory, but a daily reality and a path of resistance for Ukraine, through decentralized management, societal organization by the people who have learnt to live and prepare their future even under war conditions. Ukraine has become a unique example of new forms of cooperation between the state, military, industry and civil society. Supporting Ukraine is not charity, but a joint investment and a response to the Russian aggression. 

Alexandre Escorcia:

We need to be able to project ourselves on Ukraine beyond the short-term media coverage. Our strategic objective remains to support the Ukrainian Army, which is the first line of defense for Europe. France was the first country to deliver tanks to Ukraine, and one of the first to deliver military planes and long-range missiles. As President Macron mentioned at his speech at Istre, all of Ukraine’s military support today is provided exclusively by the coalition of the willing countries. The partnership goes beyond that: the intelligence cooperation with Ukraine is a two-way street for Europe. The relationship of trust between France and Ukraine is at its historically highest level. The support of Ukraine, on the French government, parliamentary and societal level has been unchanging and remains high, because the French share the values Ukraine defends. 

The meeting of Jan 6, 2026, in the Elysee Palace allowed to validate, with the support of the U.S., the parameters of the future negotiations. The first parameter is that Ukraine alone shall decide on every aspect of its sovereignty, including the question of territories. The second parameter is that Ukraine’s partners should assure that the future ceasefire is respected. Our vice-minister has repeated that Russia cannot be trusted. The U.S. has formally engaged in a leadership role to supervise that the ceasefire is respected, especially by the means of electronic surveillance. Europeans, within the Coalition of the Willing, decided to support Ukraine after a ceasefire with their armed forces, including the Army, the Navy, and the Airforce. NATO has recognized the Coalition as compatible with the NATO Eastern Flank defense plans. France and Great Britain are the nucleus of this coalition, while Turkey is assuming the naval leadership, and all is being built with the American support. What is important for us is that Ukraine knows that it is not alone and that we are doing everything to reinforce its place at the negotiating table. One of the ways to achieve this is through a rapprochement of the Ukrainian and European military-industrial complex. We have a lot to learn from Ukraine, both for our army and our industry. We have a lot of work ahead to accompany Ukraine’s integration into the EU, while preparing for the time when it can join NATO.

Panel 1. Attrition: What we understand (and don’t) about the war 

The Reality of the Frontline in 2026

The war is currently defined by a pace of technological change that makes strategies obsolete within months. In 2026, the strategic initiative is currently held by Russia, which has captured approximately 20% of Ukrainian constitutional territory since 2014, but only 1% in 2025. This progress has come at a massive human cost, with Russian daily losses averaging 1,000 soldiers.

The geography of the battlefield has fundamentally shifted. There is no longer a clearly defined front line but rather a 20km gray zone or kill zone. Anything entering this territory is destroyed within minutes. Units with a firepower range of less than five kilometers have lost their value due to the dominance of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). Currently, 80% of casualties are produced by UAVs, affecting personnel, vehicles, and ships. The sky has become largely empty of reconnaissance UAVs because anti-aircraft FPV drones have successfully eliminated the reconnaissance advantage on both sides.

The Industrial Knowledge Loop

Ukraine’s defense industry has evolved from a state of non-preparedness in 2014 and 2022 into a consolidated ecosystem of over 900 companies. This sector is characterized by a “knowledge loop” where feedback from the front line is collected, transformed into technical solutions, and sent back to the battlefield. The industry has reached a level of maturity where startups are growing into larger entities ready for mergers and acquisitions. In 2025, the industry achieved the procurement of over 3 million FPV drones for the army.

Sustainability in 2026 depends on long-term contracts rather than fragmented procurement. The sector faces two primary bottlenecks: a critical shortage of engineers and a structural dependency on external components. While Ukraine and Europe are attempting to reduce reliance on Chinese components, 100% independence is not yet possible. The solution lies in joint ventures and partnerships that allow for the exchange of tech teams and manufacturing capacity across Europe to create a unified security system.

Lessons Learnt

• Survivability over Platforms: Survivability now depends on dispersion, deception, camouflage, and command and control. If a unit is seen, it is engaged; the ability to remain hidden is more important than the operating platform.
• Logistics as the Center of Gravity: Staying in combat requires a massive surplus in spare parts and maintenance flows. Tactical skills will fall short without the industrial capacity to manage repair and supplies turnaround.
• Electromagnetic Field: Modern combat occurs in an environment of total electromagnetic interference. Armed Forces must assume that GPS will be denied and communications will be subject to intense jamming and spoofing.
• Technological Lifecycle: Effective technologies are renewed every half a year. The “sword and shield” cycle requires constant R&D to counter the strategic initiatives of the enemy.

The Naval Dimension and Asymmetric Denial

The Black Sea has become a specific naval domain where traditional rules no longer apply. Ukraine has implemented asymmetric sea denial, using small, remote-guided naval drones to constrain a physically stronger fleet. These “brûlots” or fire-ships represent a technical success that allows a navy with nearly no freedom of action to destroy high-value assets.

While some traditional naval leadership has been slow to accept the necessity of these systems, the Black Sea experience proves that guided, low-cost innovation can achieve strategic effects that larger, more expensive ships cannot. The future of naval combat involves learning from this technical success and adapting to a reality where traditional naval power is easily challenged by remote-guided asymmetric means.

Strategic Awareness and the “Coalition of the Willing”

In Western Europe in France in particular, the perception of war remains ambiguous. While the “Coalition of the Willing” is discussed as a success in public debate, there is a disconnect between the declaration of a readiness to deploy and the reality on the ground. French society is currently characterized by a “monotony” regarding the war; it is recognized as a reality but often feels far away.

Strategic acceptance of a high-intensity threat is now tangible among the political elite, yet there is a gap between intentions and actions. The “war economy” and new budgets are often felt as declarations rather than the immediate results needed on the front line. National resilience remains a missing part of the political debate. The frontier of the conflict is not far, and failing to prepare for the reality of attrition now will necessitate a far greater sacrifice in the future.

Panel 2. Resilience: The impact of energy infrastructure destruction, and how to protect it. Lessons for Europe from Ukraine 

The view from Ukraine

Since 2022, Ukrainian energy system has experienced 68 000 attacks on energy infrastructure: heating, power production, gas storage, transportation and distribution. Russia has changed its strategy of attack, which reflects its mass production of weapons capacity. If before they would attack each energy infrastructure target with a few Shakhed drones and missiles at a time, now each target can experience up to 400 strikes at a time, making protection almost impossible. This is rendered harder by frost: at -12 degrees Celcius in Kyiv, power workers are working with wires covered in ice. District heating should work, but Russia is attacking it as well, having seriously damaged several installations. Power is sporadic in apartments in Kyiv, with outages running up to 20 hours per day. The heating is at minimum levels in Kyiv and inaccessible in parts of the city, just as is water. In frontline regions, such as Chernihiv, Summy, Kharkiv, they have outages running for days. While repair crews are targeted separately by Russian drones, and energy companies have to come up with strategies on how to protect them. 

This leaves Ukraine in an urgent need of spare parts and equipment for all types of energy generation, transmission and distribution: transformers, back-up generators, spare parts for the grid.

Lessons learnt: 

• Importance of decentralized generation, which is harder to destroy than a centralized system. Russia is aiming at creating power “islands”: the left bank of the Dnipro is dependent on the right bank for power production. Russia is now targeting transmission lines. If it is successful in interrupting the power supply, 10 million people may remain without power, leading to a humanitarian catastrophe.
• Flexibility of grid balancing: make sure you have enough balancing power. Russia is prioritizing thermal and hydro power plants for its attacks, because they play a key role in grid balancing. For countries relying on renewables, balancing capacity should be well protected.
• Standardisation: soviet legacy transformers are hard to replace. It is important to have quick access to the spare parts or equipment fitting the system. Some type of standardization of energy equipment has to be developed, as well as stocks, since power production equipment takes a long time to make.
• Protection: drone nets can protect substations from one drone attack. They are insufficient against multiple attacks Russia is practicing. Proper protection and spare parts, especially for transformers, are the two top priorities for Ukraine.

The view from Europe 

Over the last 20 years, European policy was designed to increase efficiency and transparency, and far less focused on robustness and resilience. Smaller European utilities, like Slovenske Electarne and others like it, are focused on profitability and security investment are not among their priorities at present. 

European wholesale and balancing power markets have been integrated, resulting in massive cross-border flows, reinforced by renewables, resulting in integration of prices. On the balancing side, even a midsize company in Europe can access data about energy flows and how the infrastructure is being used. This is the opposite from what needs to be done from the resilience point of view, because leaving the flows and trading data public could allow to undermine the system. 

As an association of European utilities, Eurelectric has been very active in providing equipment to Ukraine and analytics to the Europeans about what has happened in Ukraine and how prepared European utilities are. But their conclusions from one year ago are outdated today, because of Russian change of tactics. 

Russians used 3 types of attacks:

• Cyber attacks to turn UA into an energy island, to which Europe reacted and prevented this.
• Attacks on the transmission system and hydro dams (balancing assets).
• While the Russians do not attack nuclear power plants directly, they hit the substations.

Since September, massive attacks with Shakheds and missiles resulted in a drop in interception rates to 2/3 of the launched strikes. This is not enough and has obliterated Ukraine’s energy system. Ukraine is now in an emergency and the Europeans are scrambling to respond with support.

The European utilities’ perception of risk and their preparation level differs by how close they are to the border with Russia. 60-80% of Estonian power generation is at the border with Russia in Narva. Artillery is enough to destroy it. There is no protection.

• The first response is resilience, and it costs money. Where from? Potentially 1.5% of GDP out of the 5% GDP of the NATO nations, committed to defense, could be set aside for energy infrastructure protection. 
• Second is stockpiling, especially of transformers. A pan-European system is needed where utilities can share and help each-other out. 
• The last thing is information sharing and cooperation: a transparent, open dialogue with citizens and with the defense community. A close cooperation with the energy and defense sectors is needed too.

Open data and energy security

Open data goes both ways: Ukrainian SBU and GUR have also used OSINT for precise deep strike targeting on Russia. Since then, Russia started to erase any trace of information about their energy systems on-line. 40% of the French energy capability can be erased in one day relying on publicly available data. It will be difficult to share how people protect their own infrastructure. 

Preparation to the shifting threat, especially from drones, can go through resilience. An example of Japan fighting earthquakes: through adapting their buildings, building code. Standardisation, spare parts, and repair teams working on the ground can be the best steps to grow resilience, which we can invest in now. Spare parts without the well-trained teams are not enough.

Who should pay?

Energy infrastructure threat from drones and missiles is starting to be considered by big companies and some countries. But it presents a dilemma: if the state wants to keep monopoly on force, and consequently on weapons, should it include a line of spending in the budget for energy infrastructure protection? Or should energy utilities, which have a legal obligation to ensure the operation, invest in anti-drone systems? Because even if they do, they will not have the authority or the competence to use radars, counter-drone systems or other air defense weapons. 

What Ukraine does 

Who covers the cost of energy infrastructure in Ukraine is not public. What is sure though is that business-government cooperation, which forms the basis of Ukraine’s resilience, remains true in this area as well. And both institutions share the responsibility for citizens’ energy security. Ukraine is also investing in distributed generation systems, which are harder to hit.

What Europe can do

No solution is enough to protect energy infrastructure in Europe, because the threat is evolving. What Europe can do is reviewing the legislation on state-utility cooperation. HDD framework – Harden, Disperse, Deceive – can help:

• Harden = physically protect the site: with physical nets and concrete blocks, EW jammers, spoofers to disorient drones. But the war is evolving too fast to adjust the technology.
• Disperse = decentralize.
• Deceive = camouflage the data and the infrastructure.  

The French regulation is not adapted to face a threat: armed protection is centralized and is not allowed for critical infrastructure outside of calling the gendarmes. A more decentralised response and more responsibility to the operators could boost European infrastructure defense capabilities. 

Did we mention China? 

An overlooked aspect of European energy security are Chinese suppliers of critical components of the grid systems, like transformers and substations. Battery replacement is another European dependency on an external power, where China has replaced Russia in geopolitical sense.  Chinese hardware imports is one element. Software is more nuanced, and needs protection as well. With decarbonization, the future is nuclear-renewable, where Russia and China dominate the supply chain in these two sectors. What Europe can do to reduce these dependencies? European manufacturing, including in Ukraine, which has the production and critical minerals potential.

Can renewables undermine European defense autonomy?

If current European climate and energy regulation is left unchanged, it will undermine the European defense autonomy capacity through the continuous closure of coal reserves (which can be used to make steel) and steal production. To make weapons, Europe needs to bring back heavy industry. While some progress is being made in that direction (aluminum plant construction in Finland, for example), much more has to be done for the reality to meet the ambition.

Panel 3. Resilience: Air defense and counter-drone systems (CUAS) 

The Russian air threat

The current Russian air threat is defined by a “high-low” mix of technology designed to prioritize saturation and attrition across three primary domains. In the first domain, Russia remakes massive Soviet-era “dumb” bombs, such as the KAB and FAB weighing between 500kg and 3000kg, with aerodynamic kits and guidance systems, turning them into guided, or “smart” bombs. These low-cost, high-impact weapons fly for hundreds of meters and are extremely difficult to intercept, effectively obliterating solid defensive positions. The second domain involves a sophisticated variety of deep-strike missiles like the Iskander and Kalibr launched from ships and planes. While expensive, they are increasingly used in combination with low-cost assets to overwhelm defenses. Finally, mass drone attrition has reached a consumption rate of approximately 10,000 drones per day along the front line. This has created a 25km “no-man’s land” where 80% of equipment and staff attrition occurs.

Ukrainian answer to the air terror

Ukraine has constructed a multi-layered air defense system out of necessity, though it remains under constant pressure from Russian adaptation loops. Through an overload tactic, Russia launches between 400 and 600 Shaheds or Geran’ in a single wave. A Patriot battery, which may hold 40 to 44 rockets and requires an hour to reload, is easily exhausted, forcing Ukraine to keep expensive Patriots for countering ballistic missile attacks, while finding cheaper ways to down drones. Furthermore, protecting a country the size of Ukraine or France requires a massive, continuous radar field to distinguish between Shaheds, decoys, and missiles, but current global production of specialized (smaller size) radars is insufficient for this scale. Human resource risks have also increased as pilots in fast jets like the Mirage and F-16 now face Shaheds equipped with anti-air missiles, turning a slow drone into a deadly trap for highly trained personnel who take years to replace.

The impossibility of air defense 

France and NATO allies are integrating lessons from Ukraine while facing a distinct set of strategic constraints. The idea of a “waterproof” shield is a myth; even highly efficient systems like Israel’s Iron Dome can reach a saturation point. For a territory as large as France, a waterproof shield is physically and economically impossible. France instead relies on four pillars of defense: Dissuasion or Deterrence, Active Defense through interception, Passive Defense using bunkers and discretion, and Offensive Defense by striking launch sites. There is also a significant data and organizational gap; in cities like The Hague, 18,000 drone flights were recorded in 1.5 years, with 40% occurring in restricted areas. Europe currently lacks the legal framework and real-time data analysis to distinguish between hostile actors and civilians without shooting down 30 drones a day over populated areas.

Lessons learnt

• The Adaptation Loop: The “sword vs. shield” cycle is now measured in weeks. Electromagnetic warfare (EW) that was 90% effective a year ago is now less effective as Russia introduces fiber-optic drones and EW-resistant guidance.
• Cost Asymmetry: It is economic “nonsense” to fire a multi-million dollar missile at a $20,000 drone. However, the alternative, for example letting the drone hit a billion-dollar infrastructure target, is even worse.
• Mobility is Security: Passive defense, including hiding, distributing forces, and building bunkers, remains as essential as high-tech interceptors.

Deterrence dilemma 

A critical question is what is the role of nuclear weapons in a conventional war. France’s nuclear deterrence is designed to protect vital interests, but the definition of those interests remains at the discretion of the President of France. In the context of hybrid attacks, a drone attack originating from a neutral vessel, such as an oil tanker with a Russian crew, may constitute a declaration of war. The challenge lies in responding effectively to such provocations without escalating to a nuclear exchange, which means a potential high-intensity conventional conflict.

Panel 4: Innovation in military technology, production and doctrine

The view from Ukraine

The Ukrainian Armed Forces operate an innovation ecosystem organized across tactical, operational, and strategic levels. Tactical brigades maintain their own research units while the strategic level is managed by the Center Directorate for Innovations and the Ministry of Defense. This structure supports a two month cycle from problem identification to ground solution. For instance, the recent threat of fiber optic FPV drones required a solution within this specific timeframe. 

Innovation in this context is not merely about metal or hardware. It is officially regarded as a capability and a mindset. The system uses platforms like Brave 1 and Iron Military Ground (Zalizniy Polygon) to verify applications from the civilian sector and the academia before moving them to trials. This human driven process aims to empower soldiers and students through projects like Hacking for MoD to find defense solutions.

Lessons learnt

Innovation capability means that the primary goal is not getting the next war perfectly right but ensuring you are not more wrong than your opponent. War does not allow for statistical analysis because every conflict is unique. The character of war changes constantly, requiring a cycle of adaptation faster than the enemy.

The traditional focus on heavy systems like tanks is being challenged by cheap drones. Systems costing tens of thousands of dollars can now destroy multi million dollar platforms. This shifting reality calls for combining conventional and modern technologies.

Bureaucracy is the worst possible organizational structure for innovation. Military organizations must shift from rigid command structures to models where senior officers give more decision-making power to the rank-and-file.  

Fighting power requires three components: the physical, the conceptual, and the moral parts. If the moral or conceptual part fails, the physical equipment becomes ineffective.

European Point of View

European militaries often mistakenly view drones as a standalone technology rather than a process change. While Ukraine innovates out of existential necessity, Europe lacks a similar incentive to change its internal processes. Most Western armies remain silos where bureaucratic friction prevents the rapid exchange of knowledge. There is a risk that European forces are preparing for 2030 with equipment that is already obsolete.

European sovereignty is currently undermined by a lack of independent production and software. Most military hardware and software are controlled by the United States or produced in Asia. If Europe remains a consumer rather than a producer, it loses its say in world affairs.

Role of AI

AI is an addition to conventional warfare rather than a total replacement. It serves as a tool to manage the massive data loads generated by modern defense layers which would otherwise overwhelm the human brain. The real value of AI lies in its ability to accumulate and apply thousands of years of recorded battlefield experience into robotized systems.

Russia is learning rapidly and preparing for the next conflict by increasing its production rates beyond what is currently needed in Ukraine. The West must recognize that AI and robotics will shape the 21st century and that the winner will be the side that shares and implements tactical data in days rather than years.

What Ukraine does

Ukraine is lifting the value of soldier life by introducing unmanned ground vehicles and UAVs to counter Russian human wave tactics. The current priority is the creation of fully automated robotized units. They are actively seeking cooperation with Western corporations to test prototypes like Project Pendragon in active combat conditions.

What can Europe do?

Europe must break the silos within its own ministries of defense. This requires a cultural shift where rank does not automatically equate to technical expertise. Commanders should prioritize effect based operations and foster environments where young personnel can express creativity.

European nations must also invest in their own means of production to achieve true sovereignty. This includes developing domestic software and AI capabilities to avoid total dependency on external powers. War gaming should be used more extensively to challenge existing doctrines rather than simply validating them.

Greenland versus Ukraine 

The geopolitical landscape is shifting as the U.S. administration signals a withdrawal of support for Ukraine and ambition for Greenland. This means that Europe can no longer rely on the United States for security. If Europeans fail to learn from history and build a unified security system with Ukraine, they will face similar threats on their own soil.

Panel 5. Adaptation: Russia & China vs Europe 

Russia’s Sustainability and Vulnerabilities 

Russia is often portrayed as possessing unlimited resources, but the reality reflects increasingly deep budget deficits and an exhausted National Welfare Fund. The liquid portion of this fund is nearly gone, with remaining assets immobilized by sanctions. The economic situation is an “internal fight” between the central bank combating inflation and the government’s massive war spending.

Russia faces a historically low unemployment rate, which is actually a symptom of a critical labor deficit exacerbated by mobilization and casualties. To sustain the war without a full public mobilization, the state relies on high contract sign-up bonuses and payments to families, creating long-term debt. Furthermore, Russia is strategically dependent on external actors for basic warfare resources: more than half of its explosive materials arrive from North Korea, and cellulose for gunpowder is imported from Uzbekistan.

Chinese Unequal Strategic Alliance with Russia

The partnership between Russia and China is far from equal. Since 2022, China has exploited Russia’s loss of the European market, importing over 40% of Russian oil, which however only accounts for 20% of Chinese imports, demonstrating China’s economic diversification and reliance on Western countries.

Narratives in China are divided depending who is the target audience:

• English-language media: Uses neutral terms like “Ukraine crisis” or “conflict” and quotes international figures.
• Chinese-language media: Adopts Kremlin terminology like “special military operation” and primarily quotes Russian officials (Putin, Lavrov).

China is “watching and learning” for its own potential future operations (e.g., Taiwan). While maintaining official neutrality, China provides a market for dual-use components (flight controllers, optics) and shares satellite imagery with the Russian side.

American Shift From Deterrence to Deals

The second Trump administration has shifted the U.S. stance from a geopolitical “deterrence” model to a “geoeconomic” one. The traditional “United West” concept has been replaced by an approach focused on submission and competition for Europe and transactional “deals” for adversaries.

The goal is to rehabilitate Russia as a business partner for Arctic development, oil cooperation, and AI. Ukraine and Europe are often viewed as “standing in the way” of these profitable arrangements. However, this shift is complicated by internal American “factions”: the restraints (led by the Vice President) want a total reduction of American influence, while others pursue aggressive pet projects like the Greenland annexation.

Lessons learnt: Sociological Adaptation to War

• Conducting war “from below” (Ukraine): Society takes personal responsibility. Citizens organize self-defense, help the armed forces, and view themselves as active participants in their survival.
• Conducting war “from above” (Russia): Society is atomized and views the war as a “weather phenomenon” or a storm. There is no initiative from below; citizens expect the state to provide and adjust rather than taking action themselves.
• The Cost of Stopping: For a dictator, stopping a war can be more expensive than continuing it. Reintegrating thousands of combatants into a state not prepared for them poses a higher social risk than keeping them at the front.

Strategic bottlenecks and China

An overlooked vulnerability for Europe is the dependency on China for rare earth elements. While these materials are not geologically “rare,” the technology to refine and process them is 90% concentrated in China. Europe’s structural dependency makes it nearly impossible to impose meaningful sanctions without suffering massive internal collapse. China has successfully targeted “vulnerability switches” rather than trying to outpower the West militarily.

Ukraine as a strategic substitute

Ukraine is emerging as a potential strategic substitute for Western supply chains rather than a mere security consumer.

• Drone Autonomy: Prior to 2022, Ukraine used 3,000 drones annually. Now, with 900 manufacturers, companies like Vyriy are producing drones where 98% of components are made in Ukraine.
• Cost Efficiency: Ukrainian battlefield-tested drones are 4 to 5 times less expensive than those assembled in the U.S. or Europe.
• Supply Chain Resilience: By developing its own flight controllers and optics, Ukraine is showing Europe how to reorient from Chinese dependency. Including Ukraine in the European component supply chain is a path to a safer, more independent continent.

Greenland 

The situation around Greenland is being exploited by Russia to worsen the relationship between Europe and the U.S.. President Trump’s threats to increase tariffs on countries supporting Danish sovereignty (such as France) are part of an “anchoring” technique—making outrageous bids to force a cave. For Europeans, the challenge is maintaining focus on the Eastern Front while dealing with a new, unpredictable “storm” in the North.

What Europe can do

• Act, don’t express “concern”: Stop setting the agenda based on the U.S. White House. Develop your own strategy.
• Coalitions of the willing: Continue the Coalition which develop post-ceasefire planning and military coordination outside of NATO frameworks.
• Diversify: Find new partners to ensure that when one superpower puts pressure, the alliance has options.

Leverage the market: Europe remains one of the largest markets in the world; it must not be afraid to use this economic weight as power.