On June 24, 2025, Eastern Circles hosted an event on the margins of the NATO Summit, focusing on “Building European Strategic Autonomy.”  The event was coordinated in partnership with the Munich Security Conference and The Clingendael Institute. A  keynote address  was featured from General Ben Hodges, former Commander of NATO Allied Land Command and Commanding General of the United States Army Europe (2014-17). He was joined by speakers Dr. Philippe Perchoc from the Strategic Research Institute of the French Military School, Rodolphe Oberle, Secretary General of Eastern Circles, Long-term Observer for the OSCE in Ukraine (2015-2021), and a retired member of the French Special Forces, and Anastasiya Shapochkina, President of Eastern Circles. The discussion was moderated by Edward Lucas, Non-resident Senior Fellow and Senior Advisor at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), a contributing author for The Times, and former Senior Editor of The Economist.

European defense capacity: Insights from Ukraine 

NATO members have agreed to a landmark increase in their collective defense spending target, raising it from the long-standing 2% of GDP to 5% by 2035. First, this financial commitment increase responds to the Trump administration’s demand for Europe to pay more for its own defense and is a first step for the gradual U.S. withdrawal from Europe, first of troops, then potentially of strategic weapons systems that Europe does not produce. The 5% is an attempt to avoid the latter, as the former is unavoidable. Second, it reflects Europe’s perception of a growing military threat from Russia. Third, the collective member-states’ commitment to the 5% NATO contribution goal reflects the refusal of individual states (like Spain) to commit.

The critical question becomes how to spend the money effectively (as opposed to just spend it).  How do you how do you turn that money into real defense?

Insights from the ongoing war in Ukraine highlight the importance of learning adaptive lessons and choosing how to spend money.

While the nature of war remains constant, its character is ever-changing, Ukraine has demonstrated innovation, particularly in naval warfare in enclosed seas. Despite lacking a traditional navy, Ukraine has effectively disrupted a major naval fleet using unmanned maritime and aerial systems, alongside special operations targeting key ports and Russian industrial sectors. Drones are now responsible for a significant percentage of battlefield casualties. While crucial, a cautionary note was raised against the misconception that drones alone can win wars. Experiences from the war indicate that a lack of artillery ammunition, rather than drones, was a greater impediment to holding terrain. It was asserted that cities cannot be held solely with drones.

The key to success lies in rapid adaptability and the ability of institutions to quickly learn from ongoing wars and integrate new capabilities. Proactive defense,beginning in key maritime areas in Europe, is essential to prevent a scenario of Russia attacking NATO.

Force generation and drone warfare

Since 2022, the Russian army has significantly expanded, increasing from approximately 65 brigades/regiments to around 220 by winter 2024/25, achieved through volunteers, reservists, and societal militarization. In contrast, most Western European armies have reduced reserves and abolished conscription, limiting them to 7-8 brigades with little short-term maneuverability. While an increase from ~65 brigades/regiments in 2014 to ~100 in 2025 (including UK, DE, FR, SF, RO, PL) is noted, Poland and Finland stand out for their robust and growing reserve forces, influenced by the Baltic states. The Ukrainian army has emerged as a significant force in Europe, undergoing reorganization and societal mobilization, growing from ~75 brigades/regiments in 2022 to ~110 in 2024/25.

Europe lags behind both Ukraine and Russia in drone warfare, which accounts for 70% of battlefield casualties. Ukraine initially led in large drones with Turkish Bayraktars, then developed its own, while continuously innovating in small UAVs. Russia, initially dismissive, has rapidly caught up, mass-producing cheap, large UAVs through partnerships with Iran and scaling up small UAVs. While Russia has developed naval drones, they have yet to achieve significant operational or strategic gains. In Electronic Warfare (EW), Ukraine, despite an initial disadvantage, is closing the gap, rebuilding capabilities from the ground up, making its expertise a valuable asset for European strategic autonomy. Russia started with an advantage due to its historical strength in EW.

The combined military capacity of Europe’s largest and most exposed armies is only half of Russia’s. Military parity with Russia can only be achieved in combination with Ukraine.

There are three advantages Ukraine offers to enhance European strategic autonomy from a military perspective: the size and expertise of its army, drone innovation, and EW know-how. Ukraine can play a crucial role in establishing a drone and counter-unmanned aerial systems (CUAS) doctrine center in Europe, facilitating joint training, and aligning equipment norms and standards.

European strategic autonomy in defense

Europe’s ambition for strategic autonomy in defense is critically dependent on its ability to integrate Ukraine’s wartime experience and industrial capacity, a process currently hampered by several inherent biases.

1/ A primary indicator for strengthening European defense is to expand the domestic production of critical weapons systems, yet there’s a prevalent bias that Ukraine’s competitive advantage is limited solely to drone production. This overlooks Europe’s substantial dependency on arms imports for a modern conflict, spanning essential capabilities like rocket artillery, unmanned autonomous and AI-integrated systems, long-range missiles, 6th generation aircraft, strategic lift, integrated air defense, airborne early warning and control (AEW&C), satellites, and even hypersonic missiles, where European production is limited. Furthermore, critical supply chain elements, such as weapons-grade steel slabs, demonstrate significant import reliance on adversarial nations. To genuinely enhance strategic autonomy against the current military threat, Europe must not only grow this domestic production scope but also scale up output, lower costs, improve R&D relevance, and re-evaluate procurement priorities, particularly given the battlefield prominence of drones, which account for 70% of casualties since mid-2023.

2/ A second crucial indicator is to scale up production, including drones, but this faces the bias that quantity is irrelevant due to rapid drone obsolescence. This perspective risks leaving Europe exposed if Russia is waging a drone-centric war while Europe prepares for a tank-focused conflict. Industrial cooperation with Ukraine offers not just increased scale but also crucial know-how in production modularity and the rapid evolution of products based on battlefield needs.

3/ Thirdly, lowering production costs is vital, yet it encounters the bias that European systems, while expensive and slow to produce, are inherently superior due to their complexity and aesthetic. With national budget limitations, a shift towards more cost-effective, “just good enough” weaponry is a growing trend. Ukraine’s defense industry can significantly contribute to European strategic autonomy by offering proven cost-competitiveness.

4/ The imperative to make R&D and production focus more relevant is undermined by a bias urging caution against “learning the wrong lessons from Ukraine.” This approach, however, risks learning no lessons at all. Europe has spent years observing Ukrainian experiences, and a failure to integrate these insights into its defense production means neglecting the actual logic of modern warfare and technological evolution. This bias is further evident in the assumption that the current military situations are solely due to airspace control, ignoring the significant nightly strike capacities demonstrated by one major power (e.g., hundreds of drones and dozens of missiles) against Europe’s comparatively limited air defense units. Building European strategic autonomy requires a fundamental rethinking of the entire defense system.

5/ Finally, changing procurement priorities is essential, but it is shadowed by the bias that “Europe should be ready for war by 2030.” While a valid objective, the most significant value Ukraine can bring to European strategic autonomy is addressing a broader “crisis of imagination” regarding the future character of conflict. Ukraine has pioneered drone doctrine, leading innovation, establishing specialized units, and demonstrating remarkable intellectual and industrial agility in rapidly launching production lines and integrating new capabilities. Ukraine’s battle-proven technology extends beyond drones to several other critical systems identified in reports like that by Kiel and Bruegel, which underscores the necessity for European land force system production to increase by a factor of 3-6 to counter existing force imbalances. Overcoming these biases and proactively integrating Ukraine’s battlefield experience and industrial capabilities is therefore crucial for Europe to achieve meaningful strategic autono

P.S. Eastern Circles recently published its report, “Integrating Ukraine into European Defense: Barriers and Enablers of Cooperation with Ukraine’s Defense Ecosystem,” available at: https://www.easterncircles.com/report-2025-ukraine-integration-in-eu-defence-sector/

The Baltic’s role in European defense

The discussion also touched upon the strategic importance of the Baltic Sea. While often referred to as a “NATO lake,” this perception can be misleading. The Baltic Sea is an international waterway, shallow (average depth 55m compared to the Mediterranean’s 1500m), which imposes specific constraints. Russia actively uses the Baltic Sea, escorting its “shadow fleet” with naval assets, and China has recently increased its presence, asserting that these are international waters, akin to their stance on the Taiwan Strait.

There is a clear need for better integration between NATO and the EU, alongside intermediate layers of national cooperation. The shift in the Baltic states, where security was long solely attributed to NATO, is now evolving, with Lithuanian and Estonian leadership in European security initiatives. The EU is increasingly contributing to Baltic defense across areas like mobility, defense markets, energy security, transportation, and the Baltic Defense Line, in a manner compatible with NATO. This “hybridization” of defense efforts in the Baltic Sea is expected to grow.

Ultimately, the success of these initiatives depends not just on institutional frameworks but on the willingness to collaborate. The initial reaction from some French industries, dismissing Ukrainian capabilities, has hopefully given way to a recognition of the value Ukraine brings to European defense.