PANEL 1: The Evolution of Ukrainian Defence Industry and its Influence on Europe. Moderator: Samantha de Bendern 

Speakers: Yaroslav Azhniuk, Stanislav Boiko, Xavier Tytelmann, Roman Romaniuk

Moderator: Samantha de Bendern

“I calculated how much money was invested in Ukrainian defense technology startups over the last 3 years of the invasion (excluding the funds invested in the Rheinmetall factory in Ukraine and only counting the foreign private investments in drones and other leading technologies), and it’s just $25 million. In comparison, my previous company PetCube,which makes laser toys for cats, has raised $25 million in venture capital. Does this mean that Europe, or the entire Western world, has more private capital available for cat toys than it does to help Ukraine single-handedly doing NATO’s job in holding back Russian aggression on the Eastern flank?” – Yaroslav Azhniuk 

FPVs have become the dominant lethal force of modern warfare, and are becoming more powerful by day, with AI.

FPV drone technology is dominating the battlefield in Ukraine, just like the iPhone has become ubiquitous for civilian use, emphasized Yaroslav Azhniuk. While historically the artillery has inflicted a lion’s share of casualties on the battlefield, today, this function is fulfilled by FPV drones. Costing only $500 apiece, FPVs launched by Ukrainian armed forces on the frontline have inflicted 60% to 80% Russian casualties over the last year. Inversely, Russian FPVs have caused 60% of casualties in Ukraine. 

In 2024, Ukraine produced over 2 million FPV drones, compared to 1.5 million in Russia. As a result, there are more drones than people on the battlefield in Ukraine. And their current development and applications are led by Ukraine, Russia, China, and Iran. China alone is capable of producing 2 billion FPVs. While Europe, including France, is lagging behind on FPV drone technology, production, expertise and operational training. In the current context of global rearmament, it means that Europe is falling behind technologically, economically, and politically. 

Another major tectonic shift brought by the war is the rise of autonomy through the use of AI. Full autonomy is like Uber for military delivery systems, the electronics of which systems cost only $40. 

Chinese dependency is the key characteristic of the drones industry today. The solution is to involve more engineers in decision-making processes on drones production and creating policies that support innovation. Iran is sending thousands of Shaheds to Ukraine, and North Korea is sending hundreds of ballistic missiles and tens of thousands of  soldiers to Russia. Ukraine’s FPV drone production capacity is 14 million, but the state financial capacity allows to purchase 4 million of them.

Western World must learn from Ukraine’s past mistakes. Ukraine has become a global testing ground for military technologies due to Russia’s aggression.

Stanislav Boiko outlined the changes in military technologies spurred by the war of drones. 

Anti-satellite drones, currently made by China, is the next step in drone development. The next phase is counter-drones technology to develop defense systems, including against combined attacks. A rethinking of the battlefield is under way, which includes engineering and fortification equipment. The use of conventional weapons like tanks, armoured vehicles, and even airplanes is being reconsidered. Drones, which are being automated, are increasingly central in this militaryenvironment. Ukraine, its enemies, and its European allies are all moving in this direction.

The concept of mass production has evolved. It’s no longer about what was traditionally understood; the new paradigm centers on continuous R&D at every stage. This is the present reality. Unlike in the past, where R&D would be completed and production would run unchanged for years, technology now needs to adapt constantly to meet frontline demands. R&D is an ongoing process. Meanwhile, mass production is hard to sustain.

Ukraine has created a unique ecosystem to foster seamless integration of continuous R&D into production. This success of this ecosystem depends on three pillars: high-quality engineering talent, adequate financial resources, and access to the battlefield.

Unique access to the battlefield influences the development of low-cost mass production of drones in Ukraine. The country’s production model is based on a decentralized network of small, garage-style workshops, often driven by individual initiatives and small startups. Projects like the “social drone” are examples of this approach. The key question is whether this model will remain effective in the long term. – Stanislav Boiko

Xavier Tytelman stressed that relevant military equipment is key in this war. The era of big drones is over. While Bayraktar drones continue to operate in the Black Sea, they are an easy target elsewhere, and should not be prioritized. FPV drones are cheaper and much more effective. Ukrainians are the only nation using all types of drones. But Russia is also developing this technology. In terms of production capacity, Europe is far from the war level of need: the UK produces 30,000 kamikaze drones per year, while Ukrainians use that amount in just 3 days. The reality is changing the industry, and European production levels are years behind those in Ukraine, Russia, Iran or China. As we start thinking about it, the nature of drones and warfare is evolving, and some of the products we are discussing now, which were made a couple of months ago have become irrelevant today. Furthermore, while Europe can produce spare parts to make drones, the price is too high and production scale is too low.

“The problem is that large-scale industrialization hasn’t started yet—unlike, for example, in Britain—allowing for a steady supply of drones to Ukraine today, much like we supply ammunition, and ensuring the capacity to produce and scale them for ourselves in the future, should we ever need them. Right now, the cost of a single shell is equivalent to ten drones, highlighting the shift in warfare dynamics. 

Yes, significant efforts have been made in certain areas—ammunition production, Caesar cannons, and other key weapons systems—to support Ukraine. However, a true game-changer is emerging, one that many recognize. The challenge lies in translating this understanding into industrial-scale production. Prime contractors are still waiting for finalized specifications of technologies which are already obsolete, putting us years behind. By the time the standards are set, drone technology will have already evolved, as Russian forces continue adapting their electronic warfare capabilities.” – Xavier Tytelman

Roman Romanyuk has stressed Valeriy Zaluzhnyi’s assessment that the third world war has already started, following the signatures of military alliance between Russia and North Korea, the introduction of North Korean troops to fight Ukrainian army on the Russian territory, and the construction of strategic alliances between Russia, China and Iran. 

Ukrainians have never thought they would experience a full-scale invasion by Russia. “But what we think does not determine what happens to us.” In warfare, there’s room for everyone – the strength of Europe’s military-industrial complex lies in conventional weapons, which can help Ukraine. While Ukraine hits the Russian oil and arms depots, Russia advances not through technology but by throwing tens of thousands of men in daily meat grinder assaults.

The pace of technological development is accelerating – Ukraine has introduced new weapons like maritime drones, deep-strike drones, and bomber drones (such as the “Baba Yaga”). New types of arms have appeared in the last three years, rendering entire categories of arms irrelevant. Today, an effective technological solution should be able to confront at the same time the Russian army, aviation, its drones army, while refuting the waves of human assaults. The answer lies in our ability to develop mass production of classical arms and drones, and increasing production autonomy along the supply chain. Today, much of the electronics used in heavy weapons are European. Mavics and FPV drones can be localized away from China within 10-12 months, if there is a will.

Roman’s latest to be published in 3 months explores the weapons of World War III. When the first chapter was written, the weapons described in the final chapters didn’t even exist yet. An example is Ukraine’s radical idea to break down the functions of a military ship and create a robotic unmanned system for each one. The project included drones carrying anti-aircraft systems to take down enemy aircraft and UAVs, as well as naval platforms capable of launching 40-50 FPV drones simultaneously. Many dismissed it as unrealistic—something for a distant future. Then, on December 31, 2024, a Magura sea drone shot down two helicopters near the Crimean coast. What was once theoretical has become a reality.

Ukraine and Europe are technological partners of Ukraine, and the pace of Ukrainian innovation impacts the pace of European technological development. Yet, European companies hesitate to register businesses in Ukraine over IP concerns. There is no reason to fear, as Ukraine will eventually become an EU member, assuming the EU itself still exists, and these innovations will become European. The only missing ingredient is a willingness to take risks. – Roman Romanyuk

The speed of political and business decision-making will determine if Europe will be facing belligerent Russia armed with well-sourced modern weapons or ill-equipped with outdated material. The level of European production autonomy from China will decide the level of strategic autonomy in defense.

PANEL 2: The Evolution of Military Doctrine of Ukraine, France and NATO. 

Speakers: General Vincent Breton, Colonel Henadiy Kovalenko, Hanna Shelest, Francisco Borja Lasheras

Moderator: Anastasiya Shapochkina

General Vincent Breton focused on the evolution in military strategy, as a more relevant discussion than the one on military doctrine. He reminded that Ukraine has become a valuable training ground, where Europe is learning a great deal from the war, especially on training, electronic warfare, and drone operations. He agreed that to meet the military’s needs, scaling up the production and conventional military equipment is essential. For this, defense investment needs to be prioritized within national budgets, and priorities within defense budgets have to be reconsidered, while overall more investment is needed, as well as purchasing more from Ukraine.

France is learning a great deal from the war in Ukraine, adjusting military training since the full-scale invasion. It has increasing its defense budget from 35 billion euros a year in 2021 to 50 euros a year in 2024, renewing investments in electronic warfare and drones, including mini-drones and large-scale systems, based on Ukraine’s experience. France plans to produce 1,000 drones a year for its military, with the capacity to scale production as needed. One key objective is to modernize European defense capabilities, including making procurement processes more transparent and scaling to industrial proportions when necessary. This is already happening, as production of Caesar howitzers and Mistral missiles is being ramped up to meet Ukraine’s needs.

France has never provided this level of military support to any nation in its history, but every change being made today is aimed at helping Ukraine win. – General Vincent Breton

Colonel Henadiy Kovalenko explained how the war has changed Ukraine’s military doctrine. He underlined that Ukraine began preparing for war back in 2014. Ukraine is not just defending itself, but also Europe and NATO, and can share its experience, particularly in countering cyber threats and radio-electronic warfare. 

Quoting Michael H. Clemmesen, Colonel Kovalenko reminded that “The hardest distance to cross is 16 cm from ear to ear,” and that mindset determines the outcome of a war. To reach defense autonomy, Europe must change the way it thinks of security and defense. The faster Europeans shift their thinking, the safer Europe and the world will be. – Henadiy Kovalenko

Hanna Shelest reminded that the Budapest Memorandum provided assurances, but not guarantees. The latter are legal obligations, the former are not. In times of crisis, political will becomes decisive. In Ukraine’s case, the situation is more complex because the Budapest Memorandum is not a formal treaty. Today, when we think about security guarantees and what they mean in the current context, we think of alliances, as between Russia and China, and Russia and Iran, which can destabilize its neighborhood. 

Concerning Ukraine’s security guarantees with Western countries, 27 of which have been signed in 2024 alone, there have been many promises, but few have been fulfilled, in particular on weapons delivery and to reduce Russia’s military capabilities. Furthermore, the fear in Kyiv regarding recent security guarantees is that they could be used to delay Ukraine’s NATO membership, even as they remain a major step forward.

Concerning any prospective alliances with the Global South, discussions about security often focus on the U.S.. A big anti-American sentiment contributes to Putin’s popularity with the Global South populations and elites in many countries. At the same time, countries are drawing lessons from Ukraine war: for example, marine drones are increasingly in demand by the UAE and Qatar.

An adult woman values one thing above all: when a man delivers on the promises he’s made. Ukraine, like an adult woman, has heard countless promises of military aid. Announcements flood the news, yet the reality often falls short. In the beginning of the war, it took just 72 hours from a pledge to delivery. Now, air defense systems take a year and a half to arrive. This uncertainty makes long-term planning impossible and leaves Ukraine in a vulnerable position.

The war is asymmetric—Ukraine will never match Russia in sheer numbers. The real question is whether Ukraine can compensate through superior strategy, technology, and support to maintain parity. The second, and arguably most important issue, is how to weaken Russia’s military potential. This isn’t just about deep strikes with Western missiles. Sanctions remain full of loopholes—Russian missiles and drones are still packed with European-made components. Until these gaps are closed, Russia’s war machine will keep running. – Hanna Shelest

Borja Lasheras reminds Russia’s heavy investment in drones, which leaves Europe far behind on this key technology, while militarizing its society and boosting its army in Ukraine to 600,000. His eye-witness account evokes a brutal frontline, where Europe’s contributions, especially in artillery, while valuable, have been dwarfed by North Korea’s support of Russia alone. To protect both Europe and Ukraine, more investment is required. Europe is more prepared for a scenario of 2022, but the war has evolved since. The key to European defense lies in enhancing Ukraine’s asymmetric capabilities, as Ukrainians are the ones holding the line in Europe.

The West is training Ukrainians, but we are missing a bigger picture. Ukraine has never had air superiority, one of the reasons the 2023 spring counteroffensive has failed. The U.S. and NATO overall has never entered a war without air superiority. It is an asymmetric war in which Russia is a nuclear state, has vast stockpiles of shells and resources, and no restrictions from its allies. In this paradigm, the key priority should be strengthening Ukraine’s ability to strike at long range. – Borja Lasheras

PANEL 3: The Future of Financing Strategies of European DefTech 

Speakers: Pierre Heilbronn, Alexandre Escorcia, Daniel Bilak

Moderator: Edward Lucas

The panel considered the scenarios to use the EU budget as a collateral to raise money for Ukrainian defense in order to multiply the leverage effect. Joint production and multinational cooperation, EDIP and other instruments are available. To ensure the defense of Europe, it is important to include Ukrainian actors into European budgets, materializing lessons learnt into European production. The force which forged Ukraine’s resistance was the mental force and the spirit of working together despite of national tradition to the contrary (“where there are 2 Ukrainians, there are 3 hetmans”). For Ukrainians, the ongoing war is the war of extinction: win or die. That much for negotiations.

How can Europe increase its production capacity? 

Pierre Heilbronn reminds that 40% of the equipment used in Ukraine is domestically produced. Europe can fund additional production capacity from  revenues from Russian assets, estimated 20 billion euros in 2025. It will be the responsibility of Ukrainian authorities to clearly demonstrate how these funds are allocated and spent.

Europe can strengthen its defense production by focusing on domestic manufacturing—for Europe, in Europe. Ukraine already produces 30-40% of its own equipment, but scaling up requires strategic financial decisions. One immediate step is using revenues from frozen Russian assets—€1.9 billion in the coming months, with €20 billion expected in 2025. The key question is where this money will go—will it support defense producers, following Denmark’s model, or fund other initiatives?

Perspectives differ. In Paris, the focus is on integrating countries aspiring to join the EU into new defense partnerships. Meanwhile, the EU has pledged €50 billion, but alternative funding mechanisms, like borrowing €100 billion through European institutions such as the EBRD, are also on the table.

A major challenge remains: how to navigate the fragmented European defense market and create a more unified, efficient production system. – Pierre Heilbronn 

Who are “we”?

Edward Lucas notices the generous use of the “we” word throughout the conference. “We” refers to the European concept, which begins with the judicial framework. Ukraine is already a part of this European family, and it’s crucial that we have the leadership of countries and alliances most supportive of Ukraine’s prospects moving forward to become a full-fleged EU member.

Alexandre Escorcia explains that Ukraine is now fully integrated into Europe’s defense concept. In fact, Ukrainians are perhaps even more familiar with EU defense initiatives than some Europeans. As a result, Ukrainian standards products and projects should be eligible for EU funding, despite the risks involved. It is the EU’s responsibility to assist Ukraine in developing its defense technology.

The primary goal is to ensure that Ukraine becomes fully capable, with a strategy that remains sustainable in any scenario. Support for Ukraine is unwavering; it’s not up for negotiation. Ukraine is an integral part of the European Defense Industrial Strategy, as outlined by the European Commission. In fact, Ukrainians have a deeper understanding of available financing opportunities than many Europeans themselves. The second point is that Ukrainian industry should be eligible for the EU finding mechanism but the way for that is long. The Europeans and Ukrainians are learning from each other. – Alexandre Escorcia 

Daniel Bilak draws attention to the remarkable speed of Ukraine’s deftech innovation since the war began in 2014. Several financing models are currently in use to support this innovation, including joint ventures, purchasing of jointly produced products, the Danish model, where Western countries invest in Ukrainian deftech companies directly, contractor-based service agreements, and VC investment. These are short-term solutions, but they demonstrate the flexibility needed to foster innovation. France should increase its involvement in Ukraine, as the French model could help further drive technological advancement.

Some VC firms are also backing Western companies that will innovate in Ukraine and reap substantial returns. It’s important to note that Rheinmetall’s political will enabled the company to establish a joint venture in Ukraine within just two weeks, setting a strong example.

While on the one hand there are concerns that the Trump administration may not be as favourable to Ukraine as the Biden administration has been, Biden has been has been criticized in Ukraine by many as causing “death by thousand cuts”, and spoonfeeding Ukraine with such tiny and belated amounts of military equipment as to ensure that Ukraine falls from exhaustion to prevent Russia from loosing. Today, many are skeptical that the West will provide the necessary support to help Ukraine win the fight against Russia.

For Ukrainians, they are fighting the war NATO was designed to face. In this context, innovation is not a matter of technological advancement, but a matter of survival. The stakes are incredibly high, and Ukraine needs further investment in defense technology to continue holding its ground. Access to the 300 billion dollars in Russian assets would be a crucial step forward.

The West is prepared to fight Putin down to the last Ukrainian. While NATO training without the air superiority and air maneuver is not worth the name. The Russian navy was driven out of Sevastopol to Novorossiisk (“like checking out of a 5-star hotel to live in your garage”) by Ukraine-made drones. 

The real victim of this is the Nuclear non-proliferation treaty – Daniel Bilak

If 95% of US investment in Ukraine, plus for weapons sold to the EU, goes back to the US, we are talking about net job loss. For the EU, defense is a question of jobs, just like it is for the US.