Eastern Circles Roundtable on the War in Ukraine: Challenges for European Defense Strategy, followed by 4 expert discussions
September 5-6, Paris
“Lessons Learnt, Trends in the European Defense Industry, Obstacles and Drivers of Cooperation with Ukraine” discussion panel
Speakers: Anastasiya Shapochkina and Marianna Fakhrutdinova
Moderator: Daryna-Maryna Patiuk
Europe relies on the US for strategic weapons systems: long-range missiles and air defense, autonomous systems, sixth-generation aircraft, and hypersonic weapons. To reverse this, Europe must broaden the range of systems it produces domestically, scale up production, lower costs, integrate modern war lessons into the R&D, and rethink procurement priorities.
While the European Union has historically had some instruments to support its defense industry, these mechanisms have been limited in both number and funding. Programs such as those for research and development, joint procurement, and ammunition production (like the ASAP initiative launched in 2023) were allocated modest budgets—€8 billion over eight years, €300 million for joint procurement, and €500 million for ammunition production. These amounts have been insufficient to meet the growing security challenges, especially considering that, as of 2020, 78% of EU defense procurement was done outside Europe, primarily from the United States and other partners.
In response to these shortcomings, and with shifting global priorities such as the U.S. focusing more on China, the EU launched a new financial instrument: SAFE (Security Action for Europe). This mechanism provides €150 billion in loans to EU member states to invest in their defense industries. Initially, the funding required joint applications between two EU states or between an EU state and Ukraine. However, until the spring of 2026, member states are allowed to apply individually. So far, 19 EU countries have expressed interest in these loans, nearly exhausting the full €150 billion available.
Although Ukraine is not an EU member state and therefore cannot directly apply for EU loans, it plays a growing role in the EU’s defense and security landscape. Ukrainian defense companies can participate through joint production, and EU countries are now able to procure equipment from Ukraine. This cooperation can be beneficial for several reasons. Ukraine offers significantly lower production costs, making co-production attractive to EU member states. More importantly, Ukraine brings invaluable battlefield experience, with real-time feedback through initiatives like the “Test in Ukraine” program, where donated equipment is tested under combat conditions and results are shared with industry partners.
Ukraine’s defense sector has also demonstrated agility and innovation, especially in rapidly evolving technologies such as drones and robotisation. Ukrainian startups are able to adapt quickly to changing battlefield needs—something European industries can learn from. Furthermore, Ukraine has scaled its defense production dramatically since 2022, increasing capacity from €1 billion to €35 billion and now covering 40% of its own defense needs. This combination of cost-efficiency, operational experience, and industrial scaling makes Ukraine an increasingly valuable partner for the EU and a key player in strengthening Europe’s collective defense posture.
Ukraine can help Europe across all these areas, provided biases are set aside. Its defense industry is not limited to drones but has proven capabilities in missile systems, rocket artillery, electronic warfare, counter-UAV technology, guided munitions, and modular battlefield-adapted systems. At present, Europe risks preparing for a tank war while Russia wages a drone war, leaving a dangerous vulnerability. Ukraine also shows that scale and affordability matter more than expensive, slow-to-produce systems, and that “good enough” but adaptable weapons can provide decisive advantages under budget constraints.
A deeper integration with Ukraine would allow Europe to make its R&D and production more relevant to evolving wartime needs and avoid the trap of learning no lessons from the ongoing conflict. Finally, the greatest contribution Ukraine can make is to help Europe overcome its crisis of imagination in defense planning and procurement, shifting the focus from preparing for a hypothetical 2030 war to addressing the urgent demands of today.