Newsletter 28: What is Ukraine’s air defense like now?

MARCH 2025

Newsletter 28: What is Ukraine's air defense like now?

DEFENSE NOTES

Without the air defense system Ukraine wouldn’t exist anymore, considering Russia spends $1.1 billion a month on missiles, and about $100 million on drones, producing 32-171 missiles per month, in addition to 148 ballistic missiles supplied by North Korea in 2024, and to 300 Shaheds imported from Iran every month. This allied effort has allowed Russia to launch over 2300 missiles and combat drones at Ukrainian cities in the first quarter of 2025. This makes air defense vital to protecting civilians and critical infrastructure. To upgrade its air defense system, Ukraine needed first to modernize the one it inherited from the Soviet Union.

This newsletter explains how Ukraine has transformed the soviet legacy air defense into a 21st-century system, and what challenges lie ahead.

Air defense for beginners

Air defense is a complex, multi-layered shield designed to protect a territory, its military, and its civilians from aerial attacks, missile strikes, and drones. Imagine it as a network of vigilant eyes and powerful counter-measures. It starts with radar systems, the “eyes” of the defense, like the Nebo, Buk-M, and Gamma, constantly scanning the skies, detecting incoming threats, and pinpointing their speed, altitude, and trajectory. This crucial information is then relayed to command and control centers, the “brains” of the operation, where it’s analyzed and the appropriate response is determined. The “muscle” of the system comes in various forms: long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) like the S-300 and Patriot, medium-range systems such as NASAMS and Buk-M1, and short-range defenses like IRIS-T and Tor. Anti-aircraft artillery, like the ZU-23-2 and Gepard, provides a crucial last line of defense, especially against low-flying drones. And let’s not forget the fighter jets, like the Su-27 and MiG-29, soaring through the skies to intercept enemy aircraft and missiles. Finally, electronic warfare systems jam enemy signals, disrupting the trajectories of their drones and missiles and further weakening their attack.

Source: CSO

Cat in the bag: from the inherited legacy air-defense system to NATO upgrade and mixed platforms

At the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the exact number of air defense systems Ukraine possessed was not disclosed, but we can estimate them based on public information:

Ukraine inherited a significant number of air defense systems from the Soviet Union after its collapse in 1991. As of 1997, Ukraine’s anti-aircraft missile forces consisted of 160 divisions with various anti-aircraft missile systems and complexes.
In the first days of the full-scale invasion, the Ukrainian air defense system suffered losses, amounting to about 30% of its available assets.

Considering this data, Ukraine entered this war with a respectable air defense system, but it’s now a David facing a Goliath armed with a chaotic arsenal. Resurgent Russia isn’t just dusting off old Soviet-era tech; they’re fielding a hodgepodge of weaponry from Iran, China, and even North Korea. Meanwhile, Ukraine has the daunting task of not only fighting back but also absorbing and mastering cutting-edge NATO technology—a high-stakes, real-time upgrade in the midst of a brutal conflict.

Currently, the Ukrainian Air Force’s air defense arsenal includes (from the legacy system):

S-300P/V1/V2 – long-range (75 to 200 km).
S-125-2D “Pechora” – Ukrainian modernization of the S-125 (up to 40 km).
Buk-M1 – medium-range (up to 40 km).
Tor-M1 – short-range (up to 15 km), produced in the USSR, undergoing repair and modernization in Ukraine.
Osa-AKM – mobile short-range complex (up to 10 km), modernized by Ukrainian enterprises.
Strela-10 – mobile complex against low-flying targets (up to 5 km).
Shilka (ZSU-23-4), Tunguska – anti-aircraft guns for combating drones and low-altitude aircraft.

Western SAMs provided to Ukraine (NATO system):

Patriot (USA, Germany, Netherlands) – long-range (up to 150 km).
SAMP/T (France, Italy) – long-range (up to 120 km).
NASAMS (USA, Norway) – medium-range (up to 50 km).
IRIS-T SLM (Germany) – medium-range (up to 40 km).
Crotale (France) – short-range (up to 15 km).
Hawk (USA, Spain) – medium-range (up to 40 km).
Gepard (Germany) – anti-aircraft artillery against drones and low-flying targets (up to 4 km).
Stormer HVM (Great Britain) – short-range air defense (up to 7 km).

Gravehawk ( the UK and Denmark ) – a new air defense system developed by the UK and Denmark, which uses repurposed Soviet R-73 missiles (up to 25 km)

The differences in standards between the two are world apart (as you can see from the table below):

Source: Militarnyi

Comparison of Soviet and NATO Air Defense Systems

Criteria	Soviet Air Defense System	NATO Air Defense System
Doctrine	Centralized control, designed for large-scale confrontation with NATO aviation.	Decentralized control, integrates all air defense assets into a single network.
Engagement Range	Long-range (S-300/S-400 up to 200-250 km).	Flexible combination of short-, medium-, and long-range systems (Patriot – up to 150 km, NASAMS – 50 km).
Guidance Systems	Mostly semi-active (S-300, Buk require radar illumination of targets).	Active homing (Patriot, IRIS-T, NASAMS – missiles independently track targets).
Mobility	Some systems are mobile (Buk, Tor), but most are heavy and slow to deploy (S-300, S-400).	High mobility, rapid redeployment capability (NASAMS, IRIS-T, Crotale, Hawk).
Resistance to Electronic Warfare (EW)	Vulnerable due to reliance on ground-based radars.	High resistance thanks to digital systems and active homing technology.
Network Integration	Operates autonomously, weak interoperability between systems.	Fully networked (e.g., NASAMS can use targeting data from F-16s or AWACS).
Ballistic Missile Defense	Limited capability (S-300V1 can intercept some missiles, but not all types).	High effectiveness (Patriot PAC-3, SAMP/T capable of intercepting ballistic missiles).
Defense Against Drones & Cruise Missiles	Limited effectiveness (Tor, Osa, Shilka, Tunguska can engage drones but are not optimized for this role).	Specialized systems (IRIS-T, NASAMS, Gepard, Crotale, Skyguard) are highly effective against drones and cruise missiles.
Operational Flexibility	Works based on outdated principles.	Flexible and adaptable to modern threats.

So post-soviet air defense systems are long range but less mobile, vulnerable to EW, and poorly integrated into modern networks, while NATO air defense systems are more precise, mobile, resistant to EW, digitally integrated, and better suited for modern threats. However, technologies from both sides are evolving as we write.

Ukraine is currently combining soviet systems with Western air defense to build a layered defense network which creates hybrid technology innovations.

Can Ukraine produce its own air defense system?

Building a complete, modern air defense shield is a massive undertaking, requiring not just advanced technology but also significant financial investment and a robust manufacturing base. While Ukraine has inherited a legacy of Soviet-era systems and has shown ingenuity in modernizing some of them, developing a fully indigenous system from scratch is a complex challenge. But feasible.

One of the brightest spots on the horizon: radar technology development in Ukraine. Radar systems, the “eyes” of any air defense network, are a critical component, and Ukraine possesses a strong foundation in this area. A report by ArmyInform, the Central Research Institute of Armaments and Military Equipment of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (TsNII OVT ZS of Ukraine) highlights the steady progress and growth in the domestic radar sector. This progress is driven by recent intensive upgrades to the existing radar infrastructure thanks to a robust industrial base and a tradition of expertise in radio technology.

A particular focus is on ensuring a continuous radar field at lower altitudes along the border and around critical infrastructure. Recently, several new and modernized radar systems have been adopted, including the new “Malachite” meter-wave radar, the 79K6 “Pelican” combat mode radar, the “Trassa-M” secondary radar, as well as modernized P-18MA, P-19MA, 5N84AMA, RSP-10MA radars, and a modernized PRV-16MA radio altimeter. The Institute has also prepared the 80K6KS1 radar for state testing, intended for use with anti-aircraft missile systems. This will increase target detection range and improve shooting accuracy. Furthermore, the Institute conducts research on forecasting changes in the quantitative and qualitative state of the Ukrainian Air Force’s weapons and military equipment in the medium term, including the development of methods for:

Developing a scientific and methodological apparatus for substantiating tactical and technical requirements for low-altitude field radar on an air platform (tethered aerostats, etc.);
Developing a methodology for determining the technical condition of the radio equipment fleet and forecasting its changes in the medium term;
Improving the definition of the scientific and technical level of promising radio engineering samples.

Ukraine’s rocket production is also showing promise, with the development of long-range “missile-drones” like Palianytsia and Peklo, designed as alternatives to cruise missiles. A newly developed Ukrainian missile, Ruta, has undergone successful testing. Looking ahead to 2025, Ukraine has set an ambitious goal to produce at least 30,000 long-range drones.

While a complete, domestically produced air defense system remains a long-term goal, Ukraine is actively taking steps to strengthen its capabilities. The next step is to integrate these separate elements into a unified system, similar to how NASAMS combines various components. While a concrete plan for this integration may not yet be public, the existing capabilities provide a foundation to build upon. Additionally, Ukraine has a project in development for a long-range air defense system called “Kilchen,” designed by KB “Pivdenne.” Although still in the conceptual stage, this project signals Ukraine’s ambition to develop its own advanced air defense systems. In the meantime, Ukraine continues to modernize its existing Soviet-era systems and integrate Western-supplied air defense technology, creating a layered defense while working towards the long-term goal of self-reliance.

In 2025, Ukraine plans to significantly increase its domestic weapons production, aiming to spend a record $35 billion, according to Defense Minister Rustem Umerov. The Ukrainian government has allocated $17 billion for this purpose, with hopes that allied nations will provide the remaining funds. Notably, the U.K. has already pledged to support the production of air defense systems and long-range weapons within Ukraine, as announced by Minister Umerov on January 13th.

Prepared by Daryna Patiuk.