Over the summer, Russia has been striving to convince both Ukraine and the West that it is winning the war of attrition and has the capacity to overpower and outlast Ukraine. 

Domestically, this narrative is reinforced by the scaling up and modification of Shahed/Geran’ drone production and the launch of the unprecedented autumn draft campaign of 135,000 people. The conscription, which will run from October through December 2025, is the largest fall campaign in the past nine years. Based on established practices, Russian officials are then likely to continue deceiving and coercing conscripts into signing military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense to sustain offensive operations. 

The Russian determination to continue the war at all cost is also seen in the State Budget the government submitted to the Parliament on September 29.

The largest expenditures will again go to the security sectors, with national defense bill rising to €132.35 billion and national security and law enforcement one to €42.68 billion, together accounting for about 37.8% of total spending, or €175.03 billion. This is consistent with  the 2025 budget, which allocated roughly €178 billion, equivalent to 40.88% of GDP, to these areas. Russian officials noted that defense and security spending is part of the multi-year budget framework and also includes protection of critical infrastructure, anti-drone systems, cybersecurity, and related security measures.

In foreign policy, the picture is mixed: the meeting of Putin and Trump in Alaska looked triumphant for the Kremlin, but failed the test of time, as only weeks later Trump proclaimed that Kyiv can “win all of Ukraine back in its original form”, just as Ukraine has been requesting Tomahawk missiles to grow long-strike capabilities inside Russia. 

Putin sought solace in China at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin, where the group picture featured the leader of Russia in the middle of the new global governance alliance with China and India, in contrast to the Secretary General of the UN, leaning to fit in from extreme right-hand corner of the picture. However, the announcement by Russia of a long-negotiated deal of a second gas pipeline from Russia to China remains unconfirmed by Beijing, rid of details or deadlines. At the same time, economists attribute the ruble’s recent resilience to a surge in foreign currency deposits, likely fuelled by an inflow from China. Reportedly China made a $12 billion prepayment to Rosneft for oil supplies, which temporarily supported the currency despite worsening trade conditions and monetary growth.

On the frontline the Russians’ spring–summer offensive campaign of 2025 along the front line is nearing its conclusion. During this time, Russian forces nearly halved their pace of occupation, bringing the total occupied area to 19.04% of Ukraine. Military analysis shows that in September, Russia occupied around 250 km² of Ukrainian territory, less than in June, July, or August, while losing less military personnel in dead and wounded (around 29,000 soldiers per month). 

At the same time, Russia has intensified its attacks on Ukrainian energy grid ahead of the heating system, leading to a blackout in Chernihiv, while escalating tensions around the Chornobyl and Zaporizhia nuclear power plants. The latter can be linked to Russia’s long-anticipated plans to connect the Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant to its own power grid in the event of an external power loss, first reported in May and later confirmed in official correspondence with the IAEA in June. Ukraine is attempting to respond asymmetrically to Russian actions with deep strikes by drones, absent enough domestic long-range missiles. Once their production capacity is scaled, Kyiv will no longer need deep-strike permissions from Western allies. 

At sea, Ukrainian naval drones are attacking Novorossiysk, Russia’s largest seaport, which hosts the oil terminal of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) and the Black Sea Fleet’s naval base. The CPC terminal and the Sheskharis transshipment complex, operated by Transneft, ceased loading oil after Ukraine’s drone attack.

By September 28, 38% of Russia’s refining capacity (338,000 tons per day) was offline, with approximately 70% of outages (236,000 tons per day) directly linked to drone attacks; gasoline output fell by 1 million tons in September, creating a 20% domestic shortfall and leading to scarcity in over 20 regions, including Crimea and the Far East. Repairs may take months due to sanctions blocking Western equipment, forcing Moscow to ban fuel exports, reduce import tariffs within the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), and consider lowering environmental standards, while inflation risks rise as wholesale fuel prices have surged over 40% since January and retail prices by 11–12%, their fastest increase in seven years.

Russia, one of the world’s leading oil and petroleum products exporters, is now planning to import gasoline from China, South Korea, and Singapore, while eliminating import tariffs at specific Far Eastern checkpoints and compensating importers for the difference between world and domestic prices (disadvantageous to Russia). Rosneft, NNK, and the state-owned Promsyryeimport will handle these imports, allowing Siberian refinery output (around 150,000 tons per month) to be redirected to central Russia. The government also aims to continue imports from Belarus.

The other dimension of this warfare is rhetoric. Putin continues to emphasize Russia’s stability and legitimacy, most recently in his address marking the Day of Reunification of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, and parts the occupied Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions with Russia. He also brought up the largely forgotten concept of Novorossiya (or “New Russia,” refers to a pro-Russian geopolitical movement aimed at separating southeastern Ukraine from the rest of the country) and claimed that Russia is prevailing in what he called a ‘righteous battle’ in Ukraine.

The Ukrainian president shows no intention of backing down in the war of words, recommending that the Russian leadership should seek bomb shelters and warnings of retaliatory action against attacks on Ukraine’s energy sector. A sign that the Ukrainian armed forces possess both the necessary capabilities and support from their allies, too.

Newsletter was prepared by Anastasiya Shapochkina, Daryna Patiuk, and Bohdan Kostiuk.