Over October, despite sustained pressure from the West in adoption of the 19th package of EU sanctions, and US peace efforts in organizing a summit in Budapest, Russia keeps showing readiness for a sustained war of attrition. To signal its intentions, Russia announced that it had successfully conducted a final test of its Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile with a range of 14,000 kilometers. The announcement drew a muted US response, with Trump saying that Putin should end the war in Ukraine instead of testing nuclear missiles, while noting that the US had a nuclear submarine positioned off Russia’s coast. This difference in approaches and priorities shows that Russia is not ready to compromise on Ukraine and sets the stage for a new round of the autumn-winter military campaign, shaped by Russian internal developments, sanctions, and international partnerships.

Domestically, it’s seen in the Russian government’s introduction of a bill to the State Duma in late October 2025, which formalizes the creation of “special training camps” for citizens in the military reserve. The bill authorizes the President to call up these contract reservists during peacetime to protect critical infrastructure such as oil refineries from drone attacks. Although the General Staff has stated that these personnel will serve only in their home regions and will not be sent to the war in Ukraine, an earlier draft approved by a government commission and discussed during the approval in the parliament included provisions allowing their deployment in a wider range of situations, including abroad. Security Council Secretary Sergey Shoigu announced that President Putin had personally endorsed the formation of volunteer detachments at the regional level to strengthen the protection of strategic sites. Despite official assurances, analysts remain concerned, arguing that the bill’s vague legal definitions and the reservists’ temporary status as active servicemen create a clear possibility that they could be compelled to sign combat contracts or be deployed to the front, including in the occupied territories of Ukraine. 

The measure applies to Russia’s active reserve, which includes about two million people as of October 2025. These reservists have signed contracts with the Ministry of Defense but remain civilians unless called up. It does not concern the much larger inactive reserve known as the zapas. Officially, the active reserve is voluntary, but in practice the Kremlin has pressured many irregular fighters, Cossack groups, and private military company (PMC) personnel to sign contracts with the Ministry of Defense since 2023. Once under contract, these individuals are legally considered part of the active reserve, allowing the state to mobilize them through the new amendment while continuing to present their participation as voluntary. 

The economic motive behind this legislation is central. Russia’s war economy is strained, and the volunteer recruitment model based on large cash bonuses has become unsustainable. The government has already spent more than its official recruitment budget, worsening inflation and draining the National Wealth Fund. By enabling call-ups of reservists through legal rather than financial means, the Kremlin can maintain troop numbers at lower cost. Instead of “buying” volunteers, it can now compel them to serve, reducing fiscal pressure while presenting the move as a technical adjustment to military law. 

In military terms it allows Russia to replenish its forces faster but with a loss of quality. According to the law, the “special assemblies” can get only a short period of training. Reservists sent to the frontline with minimal preparation will suffer higher casualties, weakening cohesion and combat performance. This creates a cycle of loss and replacement that sustains the war’s tempo but undermines effectiveness. It keeps manpower flowing to the front but erodes the long-term capacity of the armed forces. Politically, the change gives Putin flexibility. He can reinforce his army without declaring a general mobilization or admitting that Russia is at war, reducing the risk of domestic unrest. The Kremlin will continue to present these deployments as professional and voluntary. 

At the same time, it provides a way to rotate out the unpopular cohort of men mobilized in 2022 whose families have repeatedly appealed for their return beginning from 2023. Replacing them with reservists labeled as professionals allows the government to claim that only career soldiers remain in Ukraine. The amendment also serves Putin’s negotiation strategy. It helps Russia sustain its military presence and preserve leverage in any potential talks by demonstrating that Moscow can support its war effort without large-scale mobilization. Yet this showcase goes with high human and structural cost, as Russia is trading competence for persistence. According to the Institute for the Study of War analysis, the new law offers Putin a cheaper and quieter way to continue the war, but it does not strengthen his position on the battlefield. It prolongs the conflict rather than improving Russia’s performance and reveals a state increasingly constrained by the limits of its own population and resources.

The Russian military machine’s confidence in continuing the war is also fueled by relative successes both on the front lines and in Ukraine’s rear. While territorial gains remain limited and come at heavy cost of approximately 1,000 per day casualties between October 5 and 12, Moscow has achieved tangible results through intensified strikes on energy infrastructure and the expanded use of precision-guided bombs. 

The new tactics of attacks on the electricity grid designed to split Ukraine in two: isolating the industrial east from energy supplies in the west. About 50-60% of electricity comes from nuclear plants in Western and Central Ukraine, with the remainder mainly from hydropower and thermal (coal or gas) stations in the east. Thermal plants are vital for balancing grid stability, and Russia is now systematically targeting both generation and distribution. They also destroyed almost 60% of Ukraine’s gas production in recent weeks, forcing the Ukrainian government to start looking for almost 2 billion euro to import gas. Recent reports from influential Russian military bloggers have speculated about attacking Ukraine’s nuclear energy. For now, however, this remains largely impractical due to the international response, as seen with the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, which was recently reconnected to Ukraine’s grid after one month blackout.

Transmission substations have become another key target for Russia. Ukraine’s grid depends on about 90 critical substations that convert 750 kilovolt current from power plants into lower voltages of 330 or 110 kilovolts for regional distribution. Russia is striking Ukraine’s substations one by one, exposing how unprepared the country was for such systematic attacks. Recently, at a tense meeting, held during renewed Russian attacks that left half of Kyiv without power and water, raised questions to the energy management authorities by Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyi. Ministers offered only the familiar response of blaming their predecessors. 

This approach was illustrated at the end of October by the detention of Ukraine’s former grid operator chief, Volodymyr Kudrytsky, who was fired in 2024 despite the EU support and competence in energy system management. He played a key role in connecting Ukraine to the Western power grid in 2022 and was trusted by Western partners to safeguard the country’s energy system during the war. He is currently facing charges on a case dating back to 2018, and criticized by Ukrainian media for the lack of evidence.

Recent Ukrainian military reports claim that Russian forces are deploying a new jet-powered guided bomb. Early versions extended glide range to 40–50 km from high altitude used in the frontline areas, later iterations reached ~80 km, and now Kyiv alleges ranges of 120–150 km in operational use, with a single test claimed at 193 km. Russian analysts name three candidates for a new weapon: the upgraded Grom-1 and Grom-2 rocket-bomb complex, a modernized “UMPB-5R” gliding munition fitted with a rocket motor, and an “UMPK-PD” with a booster. They judge the rocket-assisted UMPB and UMPK variants most likely for mass production because Grom is costly and ill suited to scaling. While Ukraine is still testing the basic guided bomb model, as discussed in our podcast, Russia has already advanced by using a cheap, mass-produced bomb beyond the front line. In quantity, modular rocket-boosted variants would expose Ukrainian rear areas to systematic precision strikes, increase the number of targets that can be hit daily, and free loitering munitions and cruise missiles for other more important missions.

Russia’s foreign policy stance is under pressure. After US and Russian foreign ministers failed to finalize a Trump–Putin meeting in Budapest, the Trump administration imposed first sanctions on major Russian oil companies, Rosneft and Lukoil, explicitly calling for Moscow to agree to a ceasefire. Rosneft produces about 5.2 million barrels of crude oil per day, Lukoil about 1.6 million; together they account for more than half of Russian oil production and exports. Putin dismissed the sanctions as an attempt to pressure Russia and damage bilateral ties, but acknowledged that replacing Russian oil globally would take time and investment. Despite Lukoil’s wide operation network including Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Cameroon, Nigeria, Ghana, European refineries, and a retail network in 19 countries, this private company is considering selling the business. If the positioned buyer, Russian oligarch close to Vladimir Putin, Gennadiy Timchenko, drives the deal to closure, the U.S. sanctions design can be put in doubt. 

Beyond its role in the energy sector, Lukoil’s former security arm Lukom-A, staffed by former Federal Security Service (FSB) officers, conducts industrial espionage and cyber intelligence operations abroad. Maintaining control over Lukoil’s international assets allows the Russian state to retain access to these intelligence and operational networks. For this reason, Moscow is likely to intervene to preserve its influence, either by nationalizing the company, handing it to one Putin’s men (Timchenko), arranging a state-backed acquisition, or exerting political pressure to block potential sales, particularly in strategically important countries such as Egypt, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan.

The sanctions and attacks on oil refineries have already hit Russian key customers: China state companies have reduced purchases, India has stopped buying awaiting clarity, and Greek oil tanker companies which carry one-third of Russia’s oil exports through Western ports, started to refuse working with Russian oil companies. 

While Russian officials and commentators have mocked the European Union’s 19th sanctions package for targeting everyday items such as plastic toilets, bidets, flush tanks, flowers, leaves, moss, lichens, and motorized toys, China is taking the measures seriously as it includes military-related restrictions, covering Russian defense suppliers and businesspeople linked to China, the UAE, India, and Thailand, with 45 new entities now restricted from exporting microelectronics, UAVs, machine tools, and other dual-use goods. 

This contrasting stance on EU and US sanctions underscores China’s cautious approach to Western markets, reflecting its determination to maintain access to both Europe and the United States.Russia’s experience under Western sanctions has effectively served as a testing ground for China, which has been closely studying Moscow’s adaptation strategies and integrating these lessons into its forthcoming Five-Year Plan, emphasizing ‘high-quality development’ and technological self-reliance based on advanced manufacturing, domestic demand, regional coordination, and innovation.