Russian territorial gains in Ukraine slowed in March, while recruitment into the armed forces declined despite sharply increased financial incentives, pointing to growing manpower pressure. In response, the Kremlin is expanding coercive state tools, including tighter control of the Internet, pressure on platforms like Telegram, and broader digital surveillance, while also managing domestic political dynamics ahead of the September elections to the State Duma. At the same time, Russia is partially offsetting battlefield and sanctions pressure through high energy revenues and by seeking to disperse Western attention and military resources across other theaters, particularly the Middle East, while maintaining maximal negotiations demands on Ukraine. 

Russia’s Offensive Momentum Fades Under Manpower Strain 

In March, Russian forces increased their territorial gains by 27 percent compared with February, occupying about 160 square kilometers. However, after accounting for Ukrainian territorial recoveries, the net gain for the Russian military reached approximately 25 square kilometers. It represents a slight increase from February (minus 37 square kilometres) but indicates that the offensive momentum has decreased significantly since the end of 2025. These figures may result from several factors, including weather conditions that traditionally limit offensive capabilities during winter and ongoing challenges with manpower replenishment. 

In the first quarter of 2026, the recruitment rate for the Russian army dropped by about 20 percent compared with the same period in 2025. The rate of recruitment into the army has slowed despite the increase in regional payments for signing a military contract. On average, these payments reached a record 1.47 million rubles (approximately 16 thousand EUR). St. Petersburg increased its signing bonus to 4.5 million rubles (50 thousand EUR), making it the national leader in payment amounts. 

Amid ongoing battlefield setbacks and weakening recruitment for contract service, the Kremlin may turn to more forceful measures, including an expansion of drafting. Covert mobilization has effectively persisted under Putin’s 21 of September 2022 decree №647, which remains in force without being formally rescinded. In this context, tighter control over the Internet access could be interpreted as an indirect signal that such efforts could be intensified.

Expanding Digital Restrictions and Platform Control

Our previous newsletter argued that Russian troop losses in Ukraine were partly linked to restrictions affecting both the Telegram messaging platform and Starlink. While the limitations on Starlink stem from Elon Musk’s decisions, pressure on Telegram reflects domestic policy choices. Telegram is not only the most widely used social platform in Russia and a major source of relatively uncensored information, but also a key component of the war effort.

The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) is currently leading an aggressive campaign to force military personnel onto Max, which is a state controlled app owned by the Vkontakte (VK) group, outlining the danger of using the Telegram. Military police are reportedly conducting spot checks to ensure soldiers have deleted the app, while commanders force subordinates to register for the local alternative. However, soldiers currently describe Max as a tool used only for official reporting to satisfy superiors (despite the fact that it was prohibited to use in the frontlines in February because of the security reasons), while actual combat coordination continues in secret via Telegram through the use of paid VPNs. 

Blocking Telegram is a part of a wider government campaign to limit internet access in Russia. By mid-April 2026, the FSB has successfully pressured the Ministry of Digital Development to move beyond simple blacklisting and instead delegate repressive functions directly to the private sector. Twenty-two of the thirty largest platforms, including Ozon, Wildberries, and Yandex, are now required to integrate detection modules to identify users running VPNs. Companies that refuse to act as digital police face the loss of critical state benefits and IT subsidies, creating an environment where businesses must choose between their users’ trust and their own financial survival.

This approach can turn the internet from a public good into an elite resource accessible only to those with high level technical knowledge or the funds to pay for Internet access. For example, the Ministry of Digital Development has ordered mobile operators to impose an economic barrier by charging an average of 150 rubles (almost 2 EUR) per GB once a user exceeds 15 GB of international traffic per month. Additionally, as of April 1, operators were instructed to disable Apple ID payments via phone balance to prevent users from purchasing premium VPN subscriptions, directly impacting the 42% of Russians using iPhones. 

However, Russian telecom companies are currently pushing the Ministry to delay a new “VPN tax” scheduled for May 1, 2026. They are technically unready to implement real-time billing for 180 million users and struggle to distinguish between genuine foreign traffic and domestic services using foreign IP addresses. While the ministry views this as a compromise to reduce VPN usage without criminalizing users, industry experts warn that full technical integration could take until autumn or even longer. 

The timing of these measures can be also tied to a broader push to limit foreign platforms before the September Duma elections. Since the consolidation of power around Vladimir Putin in the mid-2000s, largely entrenched by 2008, political parties in Russia no longer function as autonomous actors but as managed instruments within the state apparatus.

Middle East Energy Shock and Russian Fiscal Relief

Despite the ceasefire, the conflict in Iran and the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz continue to provide a massive fiscal relief that can support the Russian war effort in Ukraine. The geopolitical shock in the Middle East has “neutralized” the pressure of Western sanctions, as market necessity and supply shortages have driven the Russian Urals crude to a 13-year high of $116 per barrel in early April, nearly double of the $59 per barrel which is the basis point for Russia’s 2026 budget. Moreover, the U.S. Treasury Department recently extended a sanctions waiver on Russian oil to mitigate global shortages. It means that the Kremlin’s oil revenue will grow despite now daily Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian energy infrastructure, resulting in disruptions of operations. 

Russia’s fiscal system relies primarily on taxing oil extraction rather than export volumes. As a result, strikes on ports and tankers tend to hit the revenues of individual companies involved in transport and sales, while leaving state income comparatively less affected. At the same time, reducing Russian oil exports risks tightening global supply and driving up prices. 

As Russia’s extraction tax is linked to prevailing market prices, any increase in prices can translate into higher government revenue, potentially offsetting losses and sustaining funding for both military operations and infrastructure repairs. 

Beyond these economic factors, the military ones are important as well. Since the bombing of Iran, the U.S. has been spending $500 million per day in Iran, putting the total expenses at $22bn to $31bn including the losses of high-value assets. Moreover, the U.S. military has used at least 45% of its Precision Strike Missiles, nearly 50% of its Patriot interceptors, and at least half of its THAAD missiles in the first six weeks of the war. 

Experts warn that while operations against Iran can be sustained, the current U.S. stockpile is no longer sufficient to confront a near peer adversary like China. This pressure is further complicated by what Ukrainian OSINT-group InformNapalm describes as a Reconnaissance-strike contour (RSC) system: Russia is not only supplying intelligence to Iran, but potentially exporting a structured way of fighting that integrates reconnaissance, command, and strikes into a single system. Iran is presented as a user of  this model in its own operations, which allegedly increases the effectiveness of its attacks. 

The renewed war in the Middle East has diverted American attention and munitions away from the Ukrainian theater, sending Ukraine-related negotiations. The Ukrainian side has sent mixed signals, including reported discussions about renaming a portion of Donbas “Donnyland” as a symbolic gesture toward Donald Trump, President Zelensky’s criticism of the absence of U.S. envoy visits to Kyiv as “disrespectful,” and Kyiv’s warning that negotiations on Ukraine cannot be delayed until the end of the war in Iran. Taken together, these developments give Russia room to maintain its position despite the battlefield developments, political and oil infrastructure pressure. That’s why Moscow may be willing to consider a meeting between the Russian and Ukrainian presidents, but only to finalize an agreement based on Russian demands, including Ukraine’s withdrawal from Donbas.