Ukraine Escalates Long-Range Campaign 

During May and June 2026, Ukraine’s deep strike strategy escalated with daily strikes on Russian infrastructure. Since 1 January 2026, more than 3000 drone attacks have been reported over Russian airspace and about 300 missile strikes. In March 2026, for the first time, more UAVs were recorded over Russia than Ukraine. On 18 June 2026, Russia’s Defence Ministry claimed that 992 fixed-wing Ukrainian drones had been intercepted, the biggest drone assault since the beginning of the war. For now, the Russians haven’t found countermeasures to these assaults except relying on their stock of interceptors and moving air defence from the frontline to protect Moscow. The Ukrainian strike on VNIIR Progress plant (research and development institute that specialises in the production of advanced electronic warfare (EW) systems located in Cheboksary, approximately 1500 km from the Ukrainian border) reveals that Russia’s efforts to cage a strategic facility in order to protect it from deep strikes were unsuccessful. But the main target of these attacks remains the oil and gas facilities as Ukraine aims to affect Russia’s war effort by targeting its economy. The recent attacks directly impacted the capital as Moscow’s main oil refinery had been struck twice on June 16 and 18.

Frozen Front, Burning Supply Lines 

Russian forces recorded minimal territorial gains in the assessed period, with reported advances of approximately 14 km², marking one of the lowest monthly increases since late 2023. Despite a 37.5% rise in reported assault activity exceeding 7,000 engagements, these efforts did not translate into meaningful operational or strategic breakthroughs. The data indicates continued reliance on small-unit and infiltration tactics, which have become increasingly ineffective against improved defensive detection and response systems.

Ukraine successfully repealed the Russian spring-summer offensive and both sides are holding their ground on the frontline. The Russian troops continue to create a defensive buffer zone next to the international frontier in the Sumy and Kharkiv regions. 

Also, Kyiv is conducting a mid-range drone strike campaign focused on disrupting Russian logistics deep behind the front lines, targeting trucks, fuel convoys, and rail-linked supply routes. The system uses modified fixed-wing kamikaze drones such as Hornet and Darts, enhanced with communication upgrades, including Starlink, and ranges reaching up to roughly 250 kilometers. AI is used for target recognition, navigation support, and in some cases terminal guidance, while human operators still typically retain final strike authority. The campaign is designed as a distributed system of units assigned specific road sectors, enabling continuous interdiction rather than isolated missions. Crimea also faces constant strikes from Ukraine to cut off the peninsula from Russia and impose a logistical lockdown on the region. The two main axes of communication, which are the Kerch Bridge and the “Novorossiya” (New Russia” a historical imperial term revived by Vladimir Putin to justify Russia’s claims over southern and eastern Ukraine) highway, are under constant pressure. Russian authorities temporarily closed Kerch Strait bridge on June 22 after several Ukrainian strikes while vehicles carrying critical supplies on the “Novorossiya” highway are still constantly targeted and destroyed by Ukraine.

Regarding Belarus, the country complied with  an ultimatum from Ukraine’s president Zelenskyi to remove Russian drone transponders installation based on its soil. Lukashenko turned them off but didn’t dismantle the infrastructures. Although Belarus has provided support to Russia, the country managed not to be involved in the war even if Moscow enticed Minsk to be dragged in under the scope of the Union State Treaty. Recently, Lukashenko went on a tour in Asia looking for support, especially from China to remain out of the conflict. 

Cracks in the Refinery: Russia’s Fuel Crisis

Ukrainian deep strikes on oil and gas facilities are directly impacting the Russian economy. In May 2026, Ukraine’s Defence Forces delivered 40 confirmed strikes against Russian oil infrastructure. Russian crude oil production dropped around 5% year-on-year in May to 8.7 million barrels per day, 10% below the monthly target. The situation worsened for Russia’s economy in June after Ukrainian strikes damaged the Moscow refinery, which supplies around 40% of the capital’s petrol. Due to deep strikes, approximately 83 million metric tons per year of Russian refining capacity (about 25% of Russia’s total capacity) is fully halted or significantly reduced. Refineries struck account for more than 30% of Russian petrol production and about 25% of diesel production. Overall, in June 2026, Russia lost about 25% of petrol output compared with the daily average one year ago. The drop reached 90,000 metric tons (765,000 barrels) per day.

On May 21, 2026, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said there was “no risk” of fuel shortages despite Ukrainian strikes on Russian refineries. Later, Vladimir Putin stated during a meeting on domestic fuel supply that Russia’s fuel reserves stood at 1.7 million tons, which he said was 4% lower than the same period last year. However, on the first of April, Russia started to impose the first restrictions regarding petrol export. Several shortages have occurred in many regions of the Russian Federation, leading to queues in gas stations, refuelling limitations and temporary restrictions. Crimean “authorities” declared the state of emergency as the peninsula is under constant blackout, food deficit and fuel is mostly reserved for government and military services.

Faced with a refining sector in crisis, Moscow has had little choice but to look outward for relief. 

Imports, Exports, and Export Bans 

Russia has to rely on imports to cope with the pressure on its oil industry. The country can rely on Belarus, which increased exports of petrol to Russia by 11% in May compared to April 2026, reaching 57 thousand tons. Shipments of diesel fuel increased by 23%, 50 thousand tons while aviation kerosene reached 5 thousand tons. Overall, from January to May 2026, petrol supplies from Belarus to Russia increased almost 13-fold compared to the same period last year, exceeding 270 thousand tons. Diesel fuel exports tripled to 179 thousand tons. Russia has also planned to begin sea imports of petrol from India and approached Kazakhstan as a potential supplier but no public deal has been released so far.

Despite Ukrainian strikes, Russian crude and oil product exports remained stable at around 7.4 million barrels per day in May reaching US $20.8 billion, 710 million less than in April but 65% higher than a year ago. Russia’s export volume of oil reached its highest level since the beginning of the war in 2022 with 3.46 million barrels exported per day since the beginning of the year. However, this level could decline regarding the situation in the Middle East and the course of peace negotiations between the USA and Iran. Besides, Russia has already applied a total ban on jet fuel exports until November and on petrol exports until July 31. The Russian government is currently discussing the possibility of a total ban on diesel exports in order to stabilise the domestic fuel market.

Inside Russia’s Missile Output 

On June 2, Russia carried out its largest ballistic and hypersonic missile attack with about 600 drones and 70 missiles launched. On June 15, Russia launched a similar-scale attack. Russia’s missile production gradually increased to cope with its extensive use on the battlefield. The country is expected to produce 700 ballistic missiles for the Iskander operational-tactical missile system in 2026, which means a production rate of 55-60 missiles/month. Russia also produces 40-50 Kh-101 missiles each month and is expected to produce 60 Kinzhal hypersonic air-launched ballistic missiles during the year 2026. However, as these missiles are sophisticated and expensive, it is difficult to scale their production. That’s why Russia combined their use with converted air defence missiles from the S-300 or S-400 system to saturate Ukrainian air defense. As these systems are easier to duplicate, in 2026, Russia has more than doubled its production pace of RM-48U missiles for S-300PM and S-400 air defence systems. Over 480 of such missiles are planned to be delivered in 2026, compared with around 200 in 2025. The current monthly production rate is up to 50 missiles. Regarding stockpile and production rate, Russia can launch up to 100 such missiles per month on targets in Ukraine.

Russia’s Air Defence Gap 

Successful Ukrainian strikes in the deep rear of Russian territory and beyond Moscow’s air defence ring have raised questions about the state of Russia’s air defence system. If the country is able to conduct large drone strikes on Ukrainian soil, it is not prepared to receive massive drone attacks. Large Ukrainian strikes targeting air defence systems combined with Russian offensive use of defence-oriented missiles have led to a reduction of the stockpile of S-300 surface-to-air missiles. Also, if Russia still has in its possession advanced interceptors like the Pantsir or the S-400, these systems are not a long-standing solution to destroy less costly Ukrainian UAVs. Besides, in contrast to Ukraine, Russia hasn’t developed a Sky Fortress acoustic detection network to track and destroy enemy drones. Moscow started to build drone interceptors only in the second-half of 2025 and has fallen behind Ukraine in this field. Also, Russia developed the short-range interceptor Yolka, the system remained limited with an effective range of about 3km (2 miles). Finally, considering the size of the Russian territories and the number of potential targets for Ukrainian systems, it is not possible for Russia to guarantee efficient air defence in all parts of its territory.  

To conclude, the Ukraine deep strikes on Russian energy infrastructures are a strategy with long-term effects impacting the Russian economy. With fuel and gas shortages already significant, Russian oil exports are expected to decline over the coming months, directly reducing the Russian state revenues available to support its war effort. Although Russia can reduce the impact of Ukrainian sanctions by importing resources from foreign countries, especially its ally Belarus, this appears barely sufficient to sustain Russia’s large gas and oil demand. 

Russia will certainly try to increase its production of interceptor drones to reduce the effectiveness of Ukrainian attacks. However, by the time Russia achieves sufficient production, Ukraine will have had time to scale up and increase its strikes against strategic assets. Ukraine’s ballistic missile program development, expected for 2027, is a key capacity enhancer here. Besides, given the number of UAVs launched each month, any effective protection of energy infrastructure appears impossible. Russia will increase its strikes on Ukraine to improve its negotiating position, but Ukraine’s retaliation capacity strengthens Kyiv’s ability to impose its own terms.