The relationship between Russia and the Gulf countries has evolved over the past 4.5 years, and especially over the last 4 months. While GCC states have limited leverage over Russia, and need Moscow within the OPEC+, they are among the main beneficiaries of Western sanctions. Trade with the region has grown to historic highs since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, especially in energy and real estate. Thousands of Russian companies registered in the UAE, and mutual foreign direct investment is on the rise. At the same time, while Moscow is scoring victories in business ties and related influence, it has also been losing influence in the region relative to its own performance only a decade ago. First, because of its strategic proximity to Iran; second, because of Russia’s increasing vulnerability in and from Ukraine, which challenged Russia’s image as both energy and arms exporter; third, because of the increasing agency of the Arab states over regional geopolitics. Today, “business convenience” is the main feature of Russia-GCC relations, which explains their high resilience to military and geopolitical discrepancies. And convenience means that key GCC countries need Russia less. Their relationship is likely to continue cautiously and pragmatically, prioritizing stability and continuity in outward engagement.

This study analyses how the relations have evolved between Russia on the one hand and three key GCC countries on the other: Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar. It will look at the period since the start of the Gulf crisis in February 2026, while building upon the developments over the last 5 years since the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The report is structured in four parts.

Part 1 explores the change in economic relations since 2016, ending with the last 4 months, including general trade, the evolution of energy relations within OPEC+, the GCC’s role as a sanctions evasion hub, and the foreign direct investment in Russia by the three Middle East countries through sovereign wealth funds.

Part 2 explores the evolution in defense industrial cooperation and joint projects in recent years, drawing a distinction between corporate communication and reality. It also assesses the damage of the Russian-Iranian strategic cooperation on Moscow’s relations with the GCC actors, especially in the light of continued military rapprochement with Iran during the US-Israel-Iran war.

Part 3 analyses the emergence of Ukraine as a defense actor in the Gulf and potential repercussions on Russia-GCC relations.

Part 4 looks at the cultural and religious ties between Russia and the GCC, based on Russian regions practicing Islam.

The report ends with a conclusion about the upcoming trends in Russia-GCC relations.